Ponderable



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Even FAA approved maintenance will sometimes lead to catastrophe.
I really don't think airlines want their planes falling out of the sky....bad for business.
As we all know accidents happen. Flying is still way safer than auto travel.... in 2008 34,017 Americans died in car related accidents, but in 28 years from 1982-2010 only 3,288 Americans have died from airline-related accidents. It would take over 117 years of airline fatalities to equal the same number of auto-related deaths just in 2008.


Alaska Airlines Flight 261


Alaska Airlines Flight 261 was a scheduled international passenger flight on January 31, 2000 from Lic. Gustavo Díaz Ordaz International Airport in Puerto Vallarta, Mexico, to Seattle-Tacoma International Airport in Seattle, Washington, with an intermediate stop at San Francisco International Airport in San Francisco, California.[1]:xii The aircraft, a McDonnell Douglas MD-83, crashed into the Pacific Ocean about 2.7 miles (4.3 km) north of Anacapa Island, California after suffering a catastrophic loss of pitch control. The crash killed everyone aboard: two pilots, three cabin crewmembers, and 83 passengers.

The subsequent investigation by the National Transportation Safety Board determined that inadequate maintenance led to excessive wear and eventual failure of a critical flight control system during flight. The probable cause was stated to be "a loss of airplane pitch control resulting from the in-flight failure of the horizontal stabilizer trim system jackscrew assembly's acme nut threads. The thread failure was caused by excessive wear resulting from Alaska Airlines' insufficient lubrication of the jackscrew assembly".

Conclusions

  • Alaska Airlines' extension of its lubrication interval for its McDonnell Douglas MD-80 horizontal stabilizer components, and the FAA's approval of that extension, the last of which was based on McDonnell Douglas's extension of the recommended lubrication interval increased the likelihood that a missed or inadequate lubrication would result in excessive wear of jackscrew assembly acme nut threads and, therefore, was a direct cause of the excessive wear and contributed to the Alaska Airlines Flight 261 accident.
  • Alaska Airlines's extended end play check interval and the FAA's approval of that extension, which allowed the excessive wear of the acme nut threads to progress to failure without the opportunity for detection.
  • The absence on the McDonnell Douglas MD-80 of a fail-safe mechanism to prevent the catastrophic effects of total acme nut loss

Routine maintenance of the tail section of a Northwest Airlines Douglas DC-9, the predecessor to the MD-80
During the course of the investigation, and later in its final report, the NTSB issued 24 safety recommendations, covering maintenance, regulatory oversight, and aircraft design issues. More than half of these were directly related to jackscrew lubrication and end play measurement.[1] Also included was a recommendation that pilots were to be instructed that in the event of a flight control system malfunction they should not attempt corrective procedures beyond those specified in the checklist procedures, and in particular in the event of a horizontal stabilizer trim control system malfunction the primary and alternate trim motors should not be activated, and if unable to correct the problem through the checklists they should land at the nearest suitable airport.[1]

In NTSB board member John J. Goglia's statement for the final report, which was concurred with by the other three board members, he wrote:

"This is a maintenance accident. Alaska Airlines' maintenance and inspection of its horizontal stabilizer activation system was poorly conceived and woefully executed. The failure was compounded by poor oversight...Had any of the managers, mechanics, inspectors, supervisors or FAA overseers whose job it was to protect this mechanism done their job conscientiously, this accident cannot happen...NTSB has made several specific maintenance recommendations, some already accomplished, that will, if followed, prevent the recurrence of this particular accident. But maintenance, poorly done, will find a way to bite somewhere else."[



https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alaska_Airlines_Flight_261
 
Does the NTSB usually include money saving maintenance figures in their Accident Reports? If not, please tell us how much money AA saved?

AA saved money by not having to purchase the specific maintenance equipment specified by the manufacturer. AA saved money by not performing a detailed engineering analysis of their altered procedure to determine that it could be done without damage to the engine or aircraft. AA saved money by reducing several manhours on every engine swap, which occur regularly even on healthy aircraft. AA saved money by not performing inspections looking for possible damage caused by their altered procedure.
 
AA saved money by not having to purchase the specific maintenance equipment specified by the manufacturer. AA saved money by not performing a detailed engineering analysis of their altered procedure to determine that it could be done without damage to the engine or aircraft. AA saved money by reducing several manhours on every engine swap, which occur regularly even on healthy aircraft. AA saved money by not performing inspections looking for possible damage caused by their altered procedure.
Did you read the report?
 
As my editor, what stood out the most, to you, about the report

The report is only the beginning of the tale. As a result of this accident, the FAA grounded all DC-10s for a time until they could be inspected for damage caused by similar "economical" maintenance practices, even to the point of banning foreign airlines flying DC-10s into or through US-controlled airspace.

Some aircraft accidents result because of maintenance accidents, such as not enough grease on a jackscrew, using contaminated fuel, or filling a tire with air instead of pure nitrogen. This accident, however, was the result of a misguided attempt to save money. Rather than follow the procedure recommended by MD - support the engine from above while detaching and replacing it from the pylon - AA preferred to use a forklift to support the engine and pylon assembly from below while removing and replacing the assembly from the wing. AA claimed that this would save time because the pylon-wing connection was simpler than the engine-pylon connection. When MD found out about the AA procedure, they discouraged it, pointing out that they had designed the engine and pylon with access panels and support points specifically intended for the correct procedure. When the FAA found out about it, they fined AA heavily and permanently grounded all aircraft that had been subject to the procedure, since there was evidence on the crashed aircraft and other AA DC10's of hidden damage in the bolts and mounting points where the pylon attached to the wing.
 
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The report is only the beginning of the tale. As a result of this accident, the FAA grounded all DC-10s for a time until they could be inspected for damage caused by similar "economical" maintenance practices, even to the point of banning foreign airlines flying DC-10s into or through US-controlled airspace.

Some aircraft accidents result because of maintenance accidents, such as not enough grease on a jackscrew, using contaminated fuel, or filling a tire with air instead of pure nitrogen. This accident, however, was the result of a misguided attempt to save money. Rather than follow the procedure recommended by MD - support the engine from above while detaching and replacing it from the pylon - AA preferred to use a forklift to support the engine and pylon assembly from below while removing and replacing the assembly from the wing. AA claimed that this would save time because the pylon-wing connection was simpler than the wing-pylon connection. When MD found out about the AA procedure, they discouraged it, pointing out that they had designed the engine and pylon with access panels and support points specifically intended for the correct procedure. When the FAA found out about it, they fined AA heavily and permanently grounded all aircraft that had been subject to the procedure, since there was evidence on the crashed aircraft and other AA DC10's of hidden damage in the bolts and mounting points where the pylon attached to the wing.
The FAA was not without fault according to the report.
 
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