North Korea

So the Iran deal had specific terms for verification yet was labeled the worst deal ever . . . and now, we have, Kim says! "I trust him" . . . I believe we may see that quote pop up before November this year and in 2020.
 
So the Iran deal had specific terms for verification yet was labeled the worst deal ever . . . and now, we have, Kim says! "I trust him" . . . I believe we may see that quote pop up before November this year and in 2020.
Iran Inspections in 24 Days? Not Even Close
Iran can easily stretch out the inspection of suspect nuclear sites for three months or more.

By
Hillel Fradkin And

Lewis Libby
July 21, 2015 7:38 p.m. ET
526 COMMENTS

The Obama administration assures Americans that the Iran deal grants access within 24 days to undeclared but suspected Iranian nuclear sites. But that’s hardly how a recalcitrant Iran is likely to interpret the deal. A close examination of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action released by the Obama administration reveals that its terms permit Iran to hold inspectors at bay for months, likely three or more.

Paragraphs 74 to 78 govern the International Atomic Energy Agency’s access to suspect sites. First, the IAEA tells Iran “the basis” of its concerns about a particular location, requesting clarification. At this point Iran will know where the IAEA is headed. Iran then provides the IAEA with “explanations” to resolve IAEA concerns. This stage has no time limit.

Opportunities for delay abound. Iran will presumably want to know what prompted the IAEA’s concern. The suspect site identified by the IAEA is likely to be remote, and Iran will no doubt say that it must gather skilled people and equipment to responsibly allay IAEA concerns. Iran may offer explanations in stages, seeking IAEA clarifications before “completing” its response. That could take a while.

Only if Iran’s “explanations do not resolve the IAEA’s concerns” may the IAEA then “request access” to the suspect site. Oddly, the agreement doesn’t specify who judges whether the explanations resolve concerns. If Iran claims that it has a say in the matter, the process may stall here. Assuming Iran grants that the IAEA can be the judge, might Iran claim that the “great Satan” improperly influenced IAEA conclusions? Let’s assume that Tehran won’t do that.

Now the IAEA must provide written reasons for the request and “make available relevant information.” Let’s assume that even though the IAEA may resist revealing the secret sources or technical means that prompted its suspicions, Iran acknowledges that a proper request has been supplied.


Only then do the supposed 24 days begin to run. First, Iran may propose, and the IAEA must consider, alternative means of resolving concerns. This may take 14 days. Absent satisfactory “arrangements,” a new period begins.

entire article:
https://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-inspections-in-24-days-not-even-close-1437521911
 
sbr061318dAPR20180613014510.jpg
 
Back
Top