The Anglo-Indian Encounter
In the Western Hemisphere, just as in the Eastern Hemisphere, the control of territory was based on right of conquest. Whoever could take and hold territory by force of arms could keep that territory as long as they could defend it. To be sure, the various groups in both hemispheres made treaties and alliances and often managed to resolve territorial disputes without resorting to force. But when push came to shove, possession was at least 9/10th of the law and possession was based on armed victory. None of this changed when Europeans began arriving in America. Indian territories, such as the lands of the Powhatan Confederation in Virginia, that had been conquered from other Indians came under pressure from the Europeans. Warfare was endemic, with many shifting alliances between various colonies and various tribes.
Trade was also endemic. The Anglo-Americans had plenty of high-quality trade goods. For Indians, the most desired of these were firearms, right from the start of the early days in Virginia. (See Frederick Fausz’s “Fighting ‘Fire’ with Firearms: The Anglo-Powhatan Arms Race in Early Virginia.”)
Desire for the best European guns, the flintlocks, compelled Indians to develop a sophisticated and large-scale trade economy, according to Patrick A. Malone in “The Skulking Way of War: Technology and Tactics Among the New England Indians.” Eventually, the Indian fur trade economy would bring fur pelts from the trans-Mississippi, through a network of tribes, to Euro-American traders near the Atlantic seaboard. Whereas European colonists in some other parts of the world could get away with selling primitive firearms, the Indians quickly became sophisticated arms consumers, knowing and demanding quality.
The Anglo-Americans faced a dilemma in their Indian trade. On the one hand, firearms sales were often a
sine qua non for trade relations with any tribe of unconquered friendly Indians. On the other hand, the colonists were desperate to keep firearms out of the hands of hostile Indians. The colonists enacted many laws to attempt to control the Indian arms trade, but they were exercises in futility. To the limited extent that the laws deterred Anglo-Americans from selling arms to the Indians, Indians could acquire arms from trade networks linked to New Netherland (Delaware to Albany) or New France (Canada down to New Orleans, via the Mississippi River).
Indian wars continued until the late 19th century, and nobody’s policies, including those of the U.S. government, managed to prevent Indians from acquiring arms. (See David J. Silverman’s “Thundersticks: Firearms and Violent Transformation of Native America.”)
Especially in frontier regions, many colonists lived in a state of constant peril from Indian raids. Even when there were formal treaty relations with the most proximate Indians, the Indians might change their minds and launch a surprise attack. For example, Virginia was nearly wiped out by the Powhatan in the Second Anglo-Powhatan War, which began in 1622.
To defend families and communities, the colonists were on their own. The general 17th century model of Spanish and French colonialism centered on trade outposts run by the central government in Europe and protected by that government’s standing army and navy. The English approach, though, was usually to grant a charter to a joint stock company or to a proprietor, to create some basic rules for colonial governance and relations with the mother country, and mostly to leave the colonists to fend for themselves. The English policy reduced the central government’s burden of expense for the colonies and forced the colonists to provide for their own defense.
Accordingly, most colonies enacted strict laws to instill and foster a firearms culture. This required changing the habits of some of the immigrants from Europe, most of whom came from places with much weaker arms cultures.
Of course, the colonial laws included mandatory participation in the militia by able-bodied males and mandatory personal arms ownership for such participation. That part of the story is well-known. But the colonial laws went further.
One effect of the Anglo-Indian encounter was to foster a culture of widespread household gun ownership and widespread arms carrying.
Many laws required firearms ownership by any head of a household, even if the head were not militia-eligible (e.g., the head of the household was a woman or an old man.) Heads of households had to ensure that there was at least one firearm for every male in the household age 16 or over. This included free servants and indentured servants. Some colonies required that when a male indentured servant completed his term of service, his “freedom dues” (goods given by the master, so that the former servant could live independently) had to include a firearm.
To encourage settlement, the Carolina colony (today, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia) induced immigration by offering immigrants freehold land ownership, along with strong guarantees of religious liberty. To receive the land grant, an immigrant had to bring six months worth of provisions to take care of his family while his farm was being cleared and cultivated. Also required: ‘‘provided always, that every man be armed with a good musket full bore, 10 pounds powder and 20 pounds of bullet.’’ (See “A Brief Description of the Province of Carolina” (London 1666), a pamphlet by proprietors encouraging immigration, reprinted in “9 English Historical Documents: American Colonial Documents to 1776,” David C. Douglas gen. ed., Merrill Jensen ed., 1955).
The Massachusetts Bay Colony ordered parents to arrange for arms training for all their children aged 10 or above, both boys and girls. Conscientious objectors were exempt.
Arms carrying was often mandatory for travel outside of towns and for attendance at large public events, particularly church services. Then, as now, unarmed church services were favorite targets for attack, because there would be lots of people gathered in a small space.
So one effect of the Anglo-Indian encounter was to foster a culture of widespread household gun ownership and widespread arms carrying. This was very different from conditions back in England, where the government was certainly not ordering people to always carry guns to the weekly (and mandatory) Church of England services.
Not until the New Englanders learned to fight like Indians could they defeat the Indians.
Today, when we think of the ideal armed American, we think of a person ready to act responsibly without waiting for orders from above. He or she doesn’t stand in place, but instead can move and can engage mobile threats. Another aspect of the ideal is what one writer calls “the cult of accuracy.” (See Alexander Rose’s “American Rifle: A Biography”.) Such accuracy can include slow fire from a difficult distance — perhaps an arrow against a bison many yards away — or a
Chris Kyle sniper shot from 600 yards. Rose traces the origins of the cult of accuracy to the popularity of the Pennsylvania-Kentucky rifle, which was first produced in the early 18th century by German and Swiss immigrants near Lancaster, Pa. They modified the traditional rifles of central Europe to meet American conditions and produced an astonishingly accurate, lightweight rifle perfectly suited for dense forests of the American colonies.
Yet the first Americans to participate in the cult of accuracy weren’t the 18th-century hunters of Kentucky. They were Indians of the previous century, who quickly transferred their traditional bow and arrow skills to the newfangled flintlocks.
Two volunteer units proved exceptionally able at finding and engaging King Philip’s very mobile warriors. Benjamin Church’s volunteers were 70 percent Indian. Moseley’s rangers were all from the social periphery: apprentices, servants, prisoners, and Indians. Even when the volunteer units could not catch King Philip’s forces, they kept up a fast pursuit, so that the camps of King Philip and his allies had to be abandoned quickly. Stores of food, ammunition, gunpowder and other supplies had to be left behind. The war of attrition gradually deprived the Wampanoag and their allies of supplies and destroyed their morale, leading eventually to surrender.
Not until the New Englanders learned to fight like Indians could they defeat the Indians.
Colonial Massachusetts never repeated its error from the first phase of King Philip’s War. Thereafter, military responsibility within the colony was more equally shared. To the extent that armies for extended operations could be raised by paying well for volunteers, they were. As the English militia theorists (e.g., James Harrington, “The Commonwealth of Oceana,” 1656) had predicted, a genuine people’s militia served the people. ‘‘A survey of Massachusetts records reveals no instance in which the colony’s rulers attempted to employ the militia as a police force, as a tax collector, or as an instrument of social control.’’ (See Timothy Breen, “Persistent Localism: English Social Change and the Shaping of New England Institutions,” 32
Wm. & Mary Q. 3d ser. 3, 23 (1975).)